

Recovering Simple Signals

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
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(U. Mich), and M. Wootters (U. Mich)



(Sparse) Signal recovery problem

signal or
population
length N
 k important
features




measurements
or tests:
length m

Under-determined linear system: $\Phi x = y$

Given Φ and y , recover information about x

Two main examples: group testing and compressed sensing



Group testing

Φ binary = pooling design


x binary, $1 \implies$ defective, $0 \implies$ acceptable

OUTPUT: defective set

success = number items found

Arithmetic: OR

Two main examples: group testing and compressed sensing



A diagram illustrating the equation $y = \Phi x$. On the left, a horizontal rectangular matrix labeled Φ is shown with a brown, textured background. To its right is a vertical column vector labeled x , which contains three red dots in its top three cells. An equals sign follows, and to the right is another vertical column vector labeled y , which is empty.

Compressed sensing


Φ = measurement matrix

x signal, sparse/compressible

OUTPUT: \hat{x} good approximation to x

success = $\|x - \hat{x}\|_2$ versus $\|x - x_k\|_2$

Arithmetic: \mathbb{R} or \mathbb{C}



Design problems: matrices and algorithms

Design Φ with $m < N$ rows *and* recovery algorithm s.t.

$$\|x - \hat{x}\|_2 \leq C \|x - x_k\|_2.$$

- **Adversarial or “for all”** recover all x that satisfy a geometric constraint:

tail of x is really compressible [Candes, et al.'04, Donoho '04]

$$\|x - x_k\|_1 \leq \sqrt{k} \|x - x_k\|_2$$

block sparse/compressible [Eldar, et al.'09]

sparsity patterns connected chain in binary tree

i.e., model sparse/compressible [Baraniuk, et al.'09]

- **Probabilistic or “for each”**: recover all x that satisfy a statistical constraint

fixed signal, recover whp over construction of Φ [GGIKMS'01]

uniform distribution over k -sparse signals

i.e., random signal model [Calderbank, et al.'08, Cevher, et al. '08, Sapiro, et al.'11]

Extremal models: pros and cons


- **Adversarial**

places minimal assumptions on signal \implies widely applicable
positive results hard to come by
unlikely that natural process is worst-case
which geometric model?

- **Probabilistic**

positive results easier to come by
not as applicable
debatable if natural process is oblivious to Φ or follow simple,
fully specified random process
which random process?

We need a middle ground: Compromise!



Feedback: never just measure, reconstruct once, and done

Future signals depend on measurements of current signals

Benign dependency: store inventory

Adversarial dependency: radar detection of adversary and evasive action



We need a middle ground: lower bounds and separations?

Adversarial

ℓ_2/ℓ_2 CS CGT

$\Omega(N)$

$\Omega\left(\frac{k^2 \log N}{\log k}\right)$



Oblivious


$O(k \log(N/k))$

ℓ_2/ℓ_2 CS

$O(k \log N)$

CGT

Example: error-correcting codes




message $m \in \mathcal{M}$, over alphabet Σ

encode with codebook $\mathcal{C} \subset \Sigma^n$

$$\text{rate} = \frac{\log |\mathcal{M}|}{n \log |\Sigma|}$$

Example: error-correcting codes extremal examples



Flip bits iid at random,
independent of codeword.
Expected number of errors = k



Change k bits

- **Shannon:** channel is oblivious to message or codeword
can prove existence of capacity-achieving codes
rate > 0 when $\rho = 1/2$ random errors
- **Hamming:** adversarial process
imposes strict conditions on codebook: distinct codewords
must differ in at least a fraction of 2ρ positions for ρ fraction
errors
rate $= 0$ when $\rho > 1/4$

ECC: middle ground



Adam Smith



Venkat Guruswami




Dick Lipton



Madhu Sudan



Silvio Micali



change $\leq k$ bits, **restrict** computation or information about codeword

- probabilistic polynomial time: practical but not an actual limitation
- LOGSPACE: “benign” processes only with small memory

Mallory: Adversarial model



- **Binary symmetric channel:** Entries 1 with prob. k/N and 0 with prob. $(N - k)/N$.
- **Oblivious:** Mallory generates x with no information about Φ
- **Information-theoretically bounded:** Mallory generates x with bounded mutual information with Φ .
Algorithm M is information-theoretically bounded if $M(x) = M_2(M_1(x))$ where the output of M_1 consists of at most $O(\log(|x|))$.
- **Streaming log-space:** Mallory streams over rows of Φ , has only LOGSPACE to store information and to produce vector x .
- **Adversarial:** Mallory is fully malicious.

Example: Randomized algorithms against adversaries

String of length N , $N/2$ a 's and $N/2$ b 's

Randomized algorithm to produce position of a in vector:

0. Choose k positions at random
1. If a is in (at least) one of m positions, return position
(**Success**)
else, return \emptyset (**Fail**)

Probability of success = $1 - (1/2)^m$ on any *fixed* string

If Mallory *knows* which m positions (i.e, the random string used by the algorithm), she puts b 's in those slots and **Fail!**

$A(x, r)$ = randomized algorithm, succeeds with prob. $1 - \epsilon$
 $x \in \{0, 1\}^N$ input string and $r \in \{0, 1\}^m$ random string

Results

Combinatorial group testing		
Mallory	Num. Measurements	Reference
Adversarial	$\Omega(k^2 \log(N/k) / \log(k))$	[Furedi, and more]
Information-Theoretically bounded (logspace)	$O(k \log(N))$	new
Logspace streaming (one pass over the rows)	$\Omega(k^2 / \log k)$	new
Deterministic $O(\log k \log N)$ space	$\Omega(k^2 / \log k)$	new
Oblivious	$O(k \log(N))$	new
Binary symmetric channel	$\Omega(k \log(N/k)),$ $O(k \log(N))$	new
Sparse signal recovery		
Mallory	Num. Measurements	Reference
Adversarial	$\Omega(N)$	[CDD'09]
Adversarial, but restricted so that $\ x - x_k\ _1 \leq \sqrt{k} \ x - x_k\ _2$	$O(k \log(N/k))$	[CRT'06, Donoho'06]
Information-Theoretically bounded (logspace)	$O(k \log(N/k))$	new
Logspace streaming (one pass over the rows)	$O(k \log(N/k))$	new
Oblivious	$O(k \log(N/k))$	[GLPS'10]


Sketch of results for CS

Intuition: geometry of null space of Φ

Info.-theory bounded adversary: judicious use of simple lemma and existing algorithms and matrix constructions (Gaussian, Bernoulli, and hashing)

Streaming adversary: communication complexity arguments

Intuition: $2k$ measurements for exact k -sparse signals



Example: Φ is 2×3 matrix

$m = 2$, $N = 3$, $k = 1$

$\dim(\text{null}(\Phi)) = 1$

$\dim(\Sigma_1) = 1$

For unique solution to $\Phi x = y$,


x exactly 1-sparse

$$x + \text{null}(\Phi) \cap \Sigma_1 = \{x\}$$

$$\iff \text{null}(\Phi) \cap (-x + \Sigma_1) = 0$$

$$\iff \text{null}(\Phi) \cap \Sigma_{2k} = 0$$

Intuition: null-space condition [CDD'09]



Lemma: randomized algorithms and Mallory

Lemma

$A(x, r)$ randomized algorithm with success probability $1 - \epsilon$.

Let $\ell < N$ (space assigned to Mallory-runs $M(r)$).

Fix $0 < \alpha < 1$.

For any such Mallory, $A(M(r), r)$ succeeds with probability at least

$$\min \left\{ 1 - \alpha, 1 - \frac{\ell}{\log(\alpha/\epsilon)} \right\}$$

over the choice of r .

Conclusions

For CS: same (small) number of measurements against adversaries as for oblivious with ℓ_2/ℓ_2 error guarantees

For CGT: more interesting adversaries and different numbers of measurements

Good compromise between extremes

Alternative to *statistical* or *geometric* models

Recognition of measure + reconstruct feedback
(as opposed to measure same signal *repeatedly* or measure several *simultaneously*)